Deadbeat Dads : Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked? by Monopoli, Paula A.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
12-1-1994
"Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance
Be Linked?
Paula A. Monopoli
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 257 (1994)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol49/iss2/2
University of Miami Law Review
VOLUME 49 WINTER 1994 NUMBER 2
"Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and
Inheritance Be Linked?
PAULA A. MONOPOLI*
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 257
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ........................................... 261
Il. THE CURRENT LAW ...................................................... 265
IV. A COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ADOPTING A BEHAVIOR-BASED MODEL ........... 273
A. Existing Examples of Barring Inheritance by "Unworthy Heirs" in American
Inheritance Law .................................................... 273
B. Fashioning a Default Rule ........................................... 276
C. The Purposes of the Probate Process .................................. 279
D. Will Such a Change Alter Behavior? .................................. 281
E. The Philosophical Bases of American Inheritance Law ................... 282
F. Are There Effective and Less Costly Alternatives? ....................... 287
V. ADOPTING AN EFFICIENT BEHAVIOR-BASED MODEL OF INHERITANCE FOR
"UNWORTHY" FATHERS ................................................... 291
V I. CONCLUSION ............................................................ 297
I. INTRODUCTION
"The duties of parents to their children are those which are indissolu-
bly attached to the fact of causing the existence of a human being."'
One of the most important issues facing this country is the well-
being of its children. Statistics reflecting the breakdown of American
families are sobering.2 Can children raised in less than intact families
* Paula A. Monopoli, Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law,
Los Angeles, California. B.A., 1980, Yale University; J.D., 1983, University of Virginia School
of Law. The author would like to thank Marin Scordato, Eileen Monopoli, Kathleen Meehan,
David McFadden, and Leslie James for their assistance with this article. She would also like to
thank Lawrence Waggoner and John Langbein for their insights into the revisions of Article II of
the Uniform Probate Code. Finally, the author is grateful to her children, Richard, Christopher,
Victoria, and Patrick for giving her a greater understanding of both the responsibilities and the
rewards of parenting.
1. 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, § 1 at 227, (1909), cited in
Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 82 n.71 (1990).
2. According to one organization:
Americans are more faithful about paying for their cars than for their children,
according to a new report issued today by the Children's Defense Fund (CDF).
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grow up to become productive citizens? If not, will our nation continue
its moral and social decline? As a society, what can be done to
encourage and reward parents for remaining a significant part of their
children's lives, both in economic and psychological terms? The con-
verse, of course, is what can be done to sanction or punish parents who
fail in their obligation to support their children? 3
Society uses "the law" to order social relationships. The law also
functions as an expression of our feelings about obligations among
members of society in general and families in particular. For example,
every state has laws which impose a duty on parents to support their
children.' Every state also has laws that sanction parents for the failure
to do So.5
Inheritance laws, like child-support statutes, reflect social values
The national delinquency rate for used car loans was less than three percent in
1992, while the delinquency rate for child support owed to mothers was an
astounding 49 percent in 1990.
Press Release, Children's Defense Fund, June 17, 1994.
The growth in single parent families and the failure of many absent parents-
typically fathers--to pay adequate child support are seen as the chief causes for the
rising number of children in poverty. More than one in five American children live
in poverty, compared to one in seven Americans overall.
Gregory Spears, Deadbeat Parents May Be Tracked Via Computer Systems, MIAMI HERALD, June
16, 1994, at Al. The blurring of male/female roles in society and a deemphasis on the unique role
of fathers may have exacerbated this problem. See William Safire, What Fathers Want, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 1994, at A27. "What psychological incentive can we give young fathers to do
their duty? With all its trials-the nights awake, the worries about not spending quality time,
adolescent rebellion, the money for college-fatherhood is tough enough; we don't have to strip
away its unique mystique of lifelong respect." Id.
3. President Clinton's proposal for welfare reform highlights child-support enforcement as
an integral part of reforming the system:
The administration wants to increase child-support collections from the current
$14 billion annually to $25 billion by 2000, when new state and federal data banks
would be used to match lists of those who owe child-support payments with
nationwide employment records. 'Many children in our country are being cheated
by their own parents, most often the fathers, and we are not doing enough to protect
them,' said Donna Shalala, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services.
Spears, supra note 2.
4. "In America, most states expressly require parents to support minor children." Ascher,
supra note 1, at 79. This duty of support originated in, "[tihe Elizabethan poor laws and, later on,
common law and statutes added the duty of maintenance and support." MARY ANN MASON, FROM
FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1994).
5. Most parents who fail to support their children are fathers. See supra notes 2-3. This
article will address the problem of fathers who abandon or fail to support their children. The ideas
discussed also apply to mothers. The modem trend is to gender-neutralize our language but this
may only obfuscate the real problem- fathers who do not support their children. The use of the
term "parent" instead of "father" throughout this article might leave the false impression that
mothers abandon or fail to support at the same rate as fathers. Such an impression ignores the
facts, perhaps at the expense of the analysis.
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about family. American inheritance law is responsive to changing socie-
tal norms, 6 and examining this body of law reveals a great deal about the
uniquely American view of family and inheritance.7 In addition to real-
locating property at death, inheritance statutes also convey society's
view of certain privileges which attach to family relationships and the
people included in the definition of family.
The prevailing American view bases inheritance solely on status
within the family-individuals inherit from relatives simply because
they are linked by blood or adoption. Sons and daughters do not have to
be "good" to take from their parents under intestacy statutes and gener-
ally, unworthy heirs are not punished by forfeiture of their inheritance.'
It is the exception in this country that inheritance rights are linked
to behavior.9 Most states do not require good behavior to inherit; nor,
absent murder, do they prevent anyone from taking from an intestate
relative. Most Americans would consider a father who abandons or fails
to support his children as engaging in "bad" behavior and might label
him "unworthy" to inherit from such children.' 0 However, most states
6. Note the 1994 California bill passed by the legislature but vetoed by Gov. Pete Wilson
which would have given domestic partners status similar to spouses under the California Probate
Code. See discussion infra with regard to nonmarital children and their changing position in
inheritance law. Note also the efforts of the Uniform Probate Code to respond to changes in social
norms; "The main purpose of the revisions is to bring elective-share law into line with the
contemporary view of marriage as an economic partnership." General Comment to § 2-201 of the
1990 Uniform Probate Code.
7. For example, note the difference between American and British views of nonmarital
children:
In England, the social stigma associated with illegitimacy was ameliorated by
William the Conqueror, who made no effort to disguise his illegitimate origins and
frequently referred to himself as William the Bastard. The same, however, was not
generally true in this country. The social stigma associated with illegitimacy was
actually greater in this country than in England.
Mary K. Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 65 TUL. L. Rv. 585, 588 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
8. According to Professor John Langbein, civil law systems have a much richer tradition of
unworthy heir litigation due to forced heirship provisions in their inheritance schemes.
(Telephone conversation with Prof. Langbein (July 27, 1994)). Presumably, the American
tradition of freedom of testation results in fewer situations involving unworthy heirs because a
parent may cut a "bad" son or daughter out of the will. Children have no right to take a share if
their parents choose to leave the property to someone else. However, in the case of inheritance
from children, de facto forced heirship exists in this country. Children are forced to leave their
estates to their parents because the law bars them from opting out of the intestacy/default system
by making a will. This also may account for the parallel unworthy spouse provisions in the New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia statutes. Elective share provisions for spouses
are akin to forced heirship.
9. The most notable exception is the so-called "slayer" rule in many states which bars
murderers from inheriting from their victims. See, e.g., CA. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 1994); 20
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2106(c) (1994); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803 (1990).
10. This article does not try to define abandonment or failure to support. However, generally
the author suggests that abandonment is both a failure to communicate with and a failure to
1994]
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have not conditioned the privilege of inheritance on the obligation to
support. Few have barred a parent from inheriting based on perceived
wrongdoing or unworthiness."I
Should supporting a child be a prerequisite to a father's inheriting
from that child? Should a father who abandons his child forfeit his
inheritance? Should we use the law of succession to achieve a goal
other than the simple reallocation of a decedent's property at death? In
other words, should we adopt a behavior-based model of succession
rather than the status-based model which prevails in most states? This
article evaluates the costs and benefits of shifting from a status-based
model of inheritance to a behavior-based model of intestate succession
by such fathers.
A recent Rhode Island case illustrates the situation. As one foreign
journalist wrote, "America's moral crusade against 'deadbeat dads,'
fathers who fail to pay child support, has found a new focus of contempt
in James Brindamour, a Rhode Island man who left his wife and daugh-
ter in 1983. ' ' 12 James Brindamour's daughter, Colleen, was born out of
wedlock to James and his girlfriend, Rose. James and Rose married four
years later but divorced within a year. James had little if any contact
with Colleen until she died in a traffic accident at age fifteen in 1993.
The accident resulted in a $350,000 insurance settlement. Despite his
lack of contact and his failure to support Colleen, James Brindamour
was awarded a share of the $350,000 settlement under Rhode Island law
simply because he was her father. 13
support the child. As used in this article failure to support means not complying with a legal
obligation to provide for the child economically.
11. While many states have statutes barring fathers of nonmarital children from inheriting,
only a few states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have statutes barring both nomnarital and
marital fathers (fathers of children born within wedlock) from taking. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45a-439(a)(1) (West 1993); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4 (Consol. 1994) (entitled
"Disqualification of Parent to take Intestate Share; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2 (entitled "Acts
Barring Rights of Parents"); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.10 (Anderson 1993) (entitled "Parent
Who Abandons Minor Child Barred from Intestate Succession from Child"); 20 PA. CoNs. STAT.
§ 2106(b) (1994) (entitled "Forfeiture: Parent's Share"); VA. CODE ANN. 64.1-16.3(B) (Michie
1991) (entitled "Statutory Rights Barred by Desertion or Abandonment"); 31 P.R. LAWS ANN.
§ 2261 (1993) (entitled "Disqualification by Reason of Unworthiness," incorporated into the
intestacy statute by id. § 2593); and 15 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 87 (1964) (entitled "Effect of
Divorce, Abandonment or Refusal to Support upon Rights to Distributive Share," and based on
the New York Decedent and Estate Law). The 1990 Uniform Probate Code § 2-114(c) extends
this rule to all fathers. The 1990 changes to Article If of the Uniform Probate Code have been
adopted in Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-124 (1993)) as of 1993 and will go into effect in
North Dakota (amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09), as of Aug. 1, 1995.). See 8 U.L.A. I
(Supp. 1994).
12. Ben Macintyre, Errant Father Awarded Share of Girl's Estate, THE TIMES (London), Feb.
1, 1994.
13. Id. Rose Brindamour appealed and James eventually settled for cancellation of
[Vol. 49:257
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The public response to Brindamour was outrage and disbelief that
the law could yield such a result. Many citizens felt it was unfair and
unjust to allow a father to reap a benefit from the tragic death of a child
for whom he had provided almost no emotional or financial support.
Society's initial reaction may be that the law cries out for change. But,
as this article will discuss, such a seemingly simple and fair change has
far-reaching implications.
As noted above, only a few American jurisdictions sever the inheri-
tance rights of all fathers who abandon or do not support their chil-
dren.' 4 The Uniform Probate Code has recently adopted this minority
rule. Is this a trend to be endorsed and encouraged? Should inheritance
statutes be used as an expression of society's view of the moral and legal
responsibilities of fathers? Or are there more effective and less cumber-
some ways to remedy the Brindamour problem?
What are the costs of tinkering with intestacy statutes? If we
require support as a prerequisite, or include abandonment as a bar to
inheritance, will every estate be subject to lengthy litigation about
whether and how much support was paid and what constitutes abandon-
ment? If we give courts discretion in individual cases, will judges do a
good job of exercising that discretion or will unfairness and unevenness
result?
Is it less costly to leave the intestacy statutes alone and instead
extend the right to make a will to children? A child could then opt out
of the default system of inheritance and could choose to deprive her
nonsupporting father of her estate. Should such a right be limited to a
negative will providing only that the nonsupporting father shall not take,
or should such a right allow unlimited freedom of testation? Or are
existing remedies enough? Can trusts, either express or constructive, be
used to solve the problem?
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
American society traditionally has viewed the father in a family as
the head of the household and the family breadwinner. Historically, one
of the primary aspects of the father-child relationship has been
economic: 15
The common law rules . . . reflected the notion that the father-child
relationship was primarily an economic one. Fatherhood was a cen-
tral factor in a number of rights: The right of curtesy, for example,
approximately $66,000 in back child support he owed and his release from jail. Deadbeat Dad
Gives Up Claim to Fortune, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, May 3, 1994.
14. See supra note II.
15. Kisthardt, supra note 7, at 588-89.
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was an inchoate entitlement, vesting only when a child was born into
the marriage. In addition, children were seen as extraordinary eco-
nomic assets. That this was true even after the Industrial Revolution
was evidenced by the father's continued right to the child's
earnings.
16
One of the many economic entitlements of fathers was the right to
inherit their children's estates in intestacy.17  The most significant legal
obligation of fathers was the duty to support their children. However,
these two concepts have traditionally not been linked in American inher-
itance law.' 8
At common law, children born out of wedlock ("nonmarital chil-
dren") had fewer rights to support and inheritance from their fathers than
children born within a marriage.
Because of the social and legal significance of kinship, the early
common law placed great emphasis on blood ties. Thus, a distinction
developed between children of stable, permanent relationships (i.e.,
marriage) and children of casual relationships. The distinction devel-
oped because the paternity of offspring from stable relationships was
considered certain whereas the paternity of offspring from casual
relationships was often in doubt .... An illegitimate child was con-
16. Id. (footnote omitted). Modern statutes protect a child's right to his or her earnings and
limit the right of a father to his child's earnings during life. Historically, the father's economic
rights were tied to certain duties:
Commentary writer James Kent, frequently cited by early nineteenth-century jurists,
emphasized the mutuality of the relationship. Kent wrote that because of the
father's 'obligation . . . to provide for the maintenance, and, in some qualified
degree, for the education of his infant children, he is entitled to the custody of their
persons, and to the value of their labor and services.' The right to a child's labor
therefore was seen as recompense for the father's obligation of support.
Mason, supra note 4, at 7.
17. See Joel C. Dobris, The Probate World at the End of the Century: Is a New Principal and
Income Act in Your Future?, 28 REAL PROP. PROB & TR. J. 393 (1993): "The default rule is the
coat and tie restaurants keep on hand for people who forget to wear one," and "the intestate
succession statute provides a free will for people who do not make a will" Id. at 397 n.20.
In civil law default rules are called 'yielding rules (jus dispositivum), which are
subject to the autonomy of the parties in the sense that the parties have the power to
make agreements contrary to the rule.'
The Oxford English Dictionary provides this illustration from a colonial
American statute: 'It shall be lawful ... to make Probates of Wills, and [in] default
of a will to grant Letters of Administration . .. .'
Many law professors view the trusts and estates course as an intricate web of
default rules. The law of trusts and estates is a world in which the state provides a
resolution for everyone. Those who do not like the intestate succession statute go to
lawyers to get custom-tailored wills.
Id. at 397-98 (citations omitted). But children cannot avail themselves of the custom-tailored
rules and are stuck in the web of "off the rack rules" of intestacy.
18. Note that historically this duty only extended to marital children. See Kisthardt, supra
note 7, at 588.
[Vol. 49:257
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sidered by the law to be filius nullius-no one's son. A bastard, as
he was known, therefore suffered from one of the greatest disabilities
known at common law: an inability to inherit.19
A similar disability existed with regard to the right of nonmarital
children to support from their fathers.
As in England, the greatest consequence of illegitimacy in this
country was economic. Although the illegitimate child was entitled
to support from his mother, he had no right to inherit from his father,
nor did he have a legal right of support enforceable against his father.
The economic consequences also included an inability to share in
statutory benefits and to pursue certain tort actions such as wrongful
death suits.2"
Today, nonmarital children are allowed to take from their fathers
once they establish paternity. The flip-side of this issue is whether
fathers of nonmarital children (nonmarital fathers) may inherit from
their deceased children. Historically, parents of a child born out of wed-
lock did not inherit from the child since such a child who "died without
issue had no heirs. Today, however, most statutes allow parents ... to
inherit from an illegitimate child whenever (in the case of fathers) the
claimant supplies appropriate proof of paternity."'" Some states, as well
as the pre-1990 Uniform Probate Code, condition the father's taking
from the nonmarital child on the father's having openly acknowledged
and supported the child.22 For example, California's statute reads in per-
tinent part:
If a child is born out of wedlock .... a natural parent... [does not
inherit] from or through the child on the basis of the parent and child
relationship between that parent and the child unless both of the fol-
lowing requirements are satisfied:
(a) The parent or a relative of the parent acknowledged the child.
(b) The parent or a relative of the parent contributed to the support or
the care of the child.23
Requiring nonmarital fathers to acknowledge and support their
nonmarital children serves at least two purposes. One is proof of pater-
nity. While a child born to a marriage is presumed to be the father's
child, a child born out of wedlock is not. To ensure that a man claiming
an intestate share is really the biological father of the deceased child, he
19. Id. at 587-88 (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 588 (citations omitted).
21. WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR., ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 39 (1987) (citing
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(5) (Consol. 1994) and TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42
(West 1983)).
22. See § 2-109(2) of the pre-1990 UPC wherein the father may not inherit from the child,
"unless the father has openly treated the child as his and has not refused to support the child."
23. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6452 (West Supp. 1994).
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must prove paternity. In the absence of an official adjudication of pater-
nity, acknowledgment and support of the child fulfills this purpose.
The second purpose is to punish a father for not acknowledging and
supporting his child. He has already done the child a great disservice by
burdening the child with the social and legal disability of illegitimacy.
Without this requirement of acknowledgment, it seems unfair to allow a
father to inherit from his child without having helped the child to
advance in society.
Fathers of marital children generally are not required to support
their children to inherit from them. This anomaly results in an unusual
situation: If one characterizes preventing a nonsupporting father from
inheriting as a "protection" for the dead child, the law offers less protec-
tion to children born within wedlock than to children born out of wed-
lock.24 The question becomes why such a distinction exists and whether
it makes sense. If it is unfair to allow unworthy fathers of nonmarital
children to take in intestacy, it seems just as unfair for unworthy fathers
of marital children to take.
The major focus of statutes regarding succession and nonmarital
children has been to delineate under what circumstances they should be
allowed to inherit from their fathers. Actuarially, the fathers usually die
first, so the statutes have focused on the issues surrounding when and if
an out of wedlock child should take from his father. These statutes have
laid out a number of conditions, most of which involved proof of
paternity.
As noted previously, the less frequent situation is that of the father
taking from his child. Since this situation only raises a problem where
paternity is in question, and paternity is legally presumed when a child is
born to a married couple, state legislatures have not focused on the sub-
ject of marital fathers taking from their children.
This may explain why so few states have seen fit to explicitly bar
inheritance by marital fathers who are derelict in their duties. A second
reason for the lack of legislation as to unworthy fathers in general may
be the absence of an American tradition of barring unworthy heirs from
inheriting due to the belief in freedom of testation rather than forced
heirship.25 An additional explanation for the dearth of legislative atten-
24. State statutes that protect nonmarital children but do not protect marital children whose
fathers abandon or fail to support them might be challenged on the basis that they violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Lowell v.
Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980), where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted a
nomnarital child standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute on the basis of disparate
treatment of the estates of mothers and fathers.




tion may be the context in which the father's inheritance often arises,
namely as a result of tortious conduct resulting in the child's wrongful
death.
III. THE CURRENT LAW
There are generally two situations in which fathers inherit signifi-
cant assets from their children. The first is when a child has no assets
during life, but on death his estate has value as a result of a wrongful
death claim. The second situation is when a child accumulates substan-
tial earnings or receives a large personal injury or wrongful death award
during the child's lifetime (typically for a parent's death).26 Presuma-
bly, few children who die prior to age eighteen earn substantial incomes
or receive large tort awards. Thus, most cases where children die with
substantial estates are wrongful death cases.27 Some states now deny
parents who abandon or fail to support their children the right to bring a
wrongful death action at all. A few states have done this explicitly,
either by statute or by case law.28 In many states, the wrongful death
statute compensates relatives based on their losses; thus a father who
abandons a child cannot easily prove damages because he has arguably
26. We do allow children to own property but we do not allow them to devise it. Children
may not use a will to cut out a parent who does not provide support or who has abandoned them.
In other words, they cannot opt-out of the default system of intestacy.
27. The wrongful death situation is arguably distinct from that in which a child acquires
property during his or her life. In the latter case, the child, prior to age 18, the typical statutory
age for making a will, might have formed an intent or preference with regard to disposing of it at
death.
28. See, e.g., Alabama (Adkison v. Adkison, 239 So. 2d 555, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 1970) rev'd
on other grounds, 239 So. 2d 562 (1970) (interpreting what later became ALA. CODE § 6-5-391
(1993); "The atmosphere surrounding the Alabama cases pertaining to the rights of parents to sue
for the wrongful death of a minor child is highly charged with the common-law principles of
parental duty to maintain, support and care for children .... ); McWhorter Transfer Co. v. Peek,
167 So. 291, 293 (Ala. 1936) ("[Flather has no right of action for death of minor child if he has,
by desertion or disability named, ceased to perform the parental duty of maintenance, etc. with
reciprocal right to the child's services.")); Georgia (GA. CODE § 19-7-1(c) (Harrison 1990)
providing for equal distribution between parents after wrongful death of a child but allowing for
unequal distribution if evidence warrants); Sapp v. Solomon, 314 S.E.2d 878 (Ga. 1984), aff'g in
part and rev'g in part, Solomon v. Sapp., 312 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (if father
establishes that he paid reasonable support, he is entitled to one-half of wrongful death recovery;
if he fails, he is entitled to nothing.); New York (N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS LAWS § 5-4.4(a)(2)
(Consol. 1979), referring to N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUST LAWS § 4-1.4 (Consol. 1979)); North
Carolina (Williford v. Williford, 219 S.E.2d 220, 223 (N.C. 1975) (extending N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 31A-2 (1984) to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-15(3) (1984)) ("It follows that the plaintiff father, having
abandoned the deceased when the latter was a minor child, may not now share in the proceeds of
the settlement of the claim for wrongful death .... )). See also Alison M. Stemler, Parents Who
Abandon or Fail to Support Their Children and Apportionment of Wrongful Death Damages, 27 J.
FAM. L. 871 (1988-1989) (citing Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 1492) (1974)) and Indiana
(IND. CODE ArNN . § 34-1-1-8) (Bums Supp. 1988); and Wisconsin (Keithley v. Keithley, 289
N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1980)).
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suffered little, if any, loss. This may explain why more states have not
seen a pressing need to alter their intestacy statutes to bar unworthy
fathers. However, there are still states such as Rhode Island where a
father like James Brindamour is allowed to profit from his child's death.
Wrongful death statutes fall into two categories. The majority of
states have statutes based on Lord Campbell's Act. These laws send the
award to the surviving relatives without passing the proceeds through
the deceased child's estate. Such statutes may compensate the survivors
for direct economic loss and non-economic loss such as companionship.
They also may permit punitive damages.29
A minority of states have a second type of wrongful death statute
based on the premise that the lawsuit belongs to the decedent. The dece-
dent's cause of action for negligence is thus statutorily extended after his
death. The lawsuit is intended to compensate the decedent for pain and
suffering, medical expenses, and loss of earnings. Thus, the monetary
award or settlement often is characterized as the decedent's asset, and
thus part of his estate. Some of these survival statutes mandate distribu-
tion directly to the survivors based strictly on who takes under the state
intestacy statute rather than who has suffered a loss.3"
This latter type of statute often results in the child's intestate heirs,
typically the mother and father, sharing equally. Since the vast majority
of state intestacy laws do not prohibit unworthy fathers from taking in
intestacy,3 the proceeds of the wrongful death award must be allocated
equally between mother and father.32 As Brindamour demonstrates,
state statutes that direct the award for items such as lost earnings through
the decedent's estate or which distribute the award according to the
intestacy statute still yield arguably inequitable results; fathers who do
nothing for their children still inherit. 33 Such results would be precluded
29. Stemler, supra note 28, at 871.
30. Id. at 872.
31. The exceptions are listed supra note 11.
32. One remedy suggested in the literature is the adoption of wrongful death statutes which
bypass the decedent's estate and distribute wrongful death awards based solely on losses. For
example, the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Survival and Death Act provides that the "trier
of fact shall make separate awards to each of the survivors entitled to damages." UNIF. MODEL
SURVIVAL AND DEATH AcT, § 3(f), 8A U.L.A. 595 (1983). The Act does not preclude bad fathers
from recovering but those who advocate its adoption argue that an explicit preclusion is
unnecessary since a parent who had no relationship with the child cannot prevail under a statute
which awards damages based on loss. Those who argue for this resolution acknowledge that
parents who abandon and fail to support their children will not recover under the current law in
most wrongful death cases. Stemler, supra note 28 at 878-879 (citing Unif. Model Survival and
Death Act, § 3(f), 8A U.L.A. 594 (1983)).
33. The inequity is illustrated in the Brindamour case:
In determining how the money should be divided, Judge Darigan accepted an
estimate from Mrs. Brindamour's lawyer that, based on actuarial estimates, Colleen
[Vol. 49:257
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by amending state intestacy statutes to bar both marital and nonmarital
fathers who abandon or do not support from sharing in the child's estate.
Currently, only Connecticut, Montana, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands send the message to all fathers through the intestacy statutes that
if they abandon or do not support their child, they will not reap a wind-
fall by inheriting from that child. In 1927, North Carolina became the
first state to adopt this approach. The North Carolina statute provides
that:
Any parent who has wilfully abandoned the care and mainte-
nance of his or her child shall lose all right to intestate succession in
any part of the child's estate and all right to administer the estate of
the child, except -
(1) Where the abandoning parent resumed its care and maintenance
at least one year prior to the death of the child and continued the
same until its death; or
(2) Where a parent has been deprived of the custody of his or her
child under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the par-
ent has substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring
contribution to the support of the child.34
The Committee that amended this law in 1961 stated:
It seems very inequitable to allow a parent who has abandoned his
child to inherit from such child when the child dies intestate. How-
ever when a question of this nature has come before the court and the
intestacy law of the particular jurisdiction has made no exception
because of abandonment, the courts have been reluctant to imply an
exception. It can and does happen that the child is too young to make
a will cutting off the guilty parent.35
could have earned a total of $680,574 had she lived a normal life span. He also
determined that Rose Brindamour was due $300,000 for the loss of her daughter's
companionship.
The total of $980,574 represented the amount that could have been paid out in
the suit if more money were available.
Since the $300,000 that Darigan decided was theoretically due Rose
Brindamour equaled about 30 percent of the $980,574, he awarded her 30 percent of
the actual $350,000 settlement, or $107,065.
The remaining 70 percent - $243,935- will go into Colleen's estate.
Jim Hummel, Absent Dad Could Get $100,000 From Estate, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Jan. 29, 1994,
at Al. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-6 (1985) provides that the amount recovered under R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 10-7-5 (1985) for lost earnings, "shall go to the decedent's estate and become part thereof."
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2 (1984). See Williford v. Williford, 219 S.E.2d 200, 220-221
(N.C. 1975) (where father sought to recover one-half of the proceeds recovered by the mother for
the wrongful death of their child, supreme court held that the proceeds should be distributed
according to laws of intestacy, and father, who had abandoned the child, was not entitled to share
in the proceeds).
35. SPECIAL REPORT OF THE GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION ON AN ACT TO BE ENTITLED
"ACTs BARRING PROPERTY RIGHTS" (Feb. 8, 1961) at 4 [hereinafter Special Report].
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Prior to this amendment, North Carolina courts had shown such a
reluctance to prohibit unworthy fathers from taking an intestate share
absent statutory authority. In Avery v. Brantley,36 prior to the enactment
of North Carolina's statute, the court felt constrained to award one-half
of the child's estate to each parent, "[u]nder the law as written. '3 7 The
mother in Avery alleged that the father had abandoned the child. The
child subsequently fell down an elevator shaft and died. The mother
challenged the distribution of one-half of the wrongful death award to
the father. She urged the court to look to the state adoption statute,
which stated that a father lost all rights and privileges vis-a-vis his child
if he willfully abandoned the child. However, the court stated, "We can-
not stretch the language of [that] statute ...to meet the facts in the
present case. To do so we would make, and not construe, the law." 38
More recently, the judge in Brindamour stated, "This court, quite
frankly, wishes it could have awarded more to Rose Brindamour....
But this is a court of law, not a court of emotion or compassion. '39
The North Carolina legislature responded to Avery by enacting a
statute which barred all parents who abandon their children from taking
an intestate share. Other states followed North Carolina's lead. For
example, the New York statute, adopted in 1941, reads in pertinent part:
4-1.4 Disqualification of parent to take intestate share
(a) No distributive share in the estate of a deceased child shall
be allowed to a parent who has failed or refused to provide for, or has
abandoned such child while such child is under the age of twenty-one
years, whether or not such child dies before having attained the age
of twenty-one years, unless the parental relationship and duties are
subsequently resumed and continue until the death of the child.
(b) In the event that a parent or spouse is disqualified from tak-
ing a distributive share in the estate of a decedent, under this section
or 5-1.2, the estate of such decedent shall be distributed in accord-
ance with 4-1.1 as though such spouse or parent had predeceased the
decedent.4°
36. 131 S.E. 721 (1926).
37. Id. at 723.
38. Id. at 722. North Carolina responded to Avery in 1927 by adding a proviso to the
intestacy statute (N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 28-149(6)) which stated, "provided that a parent or parents who
has willfully abandoned the care, custody, nurture and maintenance of such child to its kindred,
relatives or other person, shall forfeit all and every right to participate in any part of said child's
estate under the provisions of this section". In 1961, the Special Committee was asked to combine
this and other provisions regarding unworthy heirs into a single comprehensive chapter. This
resulted in the current statute, § 3 1 A-2, which the drafting committee stated, "broadens the former
rule." Special Report, supra note 35, at 4.
39. Hummel, supra note 33, at Al.
40. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4 (McKinney 1981). This section was added in
connection with a similar prohibition disqualifying parents from sharing in damages recovered for
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In recent years, Pennsylvania,41 Connecticut,42 Ohio 43 and Vir-
ginia"4 have all adopted similar measures. Montana 45  and North
Dakota,4 6 which have adopted the 1990 changes to Article II of the Uni-
form Probate Code, have or will soon have a similar rule. The Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico has long had a similar prohibition, titled
"Disqualification by Reason of Unworthiness." That statute, derived
from the Spanish Civil Code, states in pertinent part: "The following are
disqualified to succeed by reason of unworthiness: (1) Parents who have
abandoned their children or prostituted their daughters or made attempts
the wrongful death of a child. Patrick J. Rohan, Practice Commentary, N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUST LAW § 4-1.4 (McKinney 1981), at 744.
41. PA. CONS. STAT. § 2106(b) reads in pertinent part:
Any parent who, for one year or upwards previous to the death of the parent's minor
or dependent child, has willfully neglected or failed to perform any duty of support
owed to the minor or dependent child or who, for one year, has willfully deserted
the minor or dependent child shall have no right or interest under this chapter in the
real or personal estate of the minor or dependent child.
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-439(a)(l) (West 1993) reads in pertinent part:
If there are no children or any legal representatives of them, then, after the portion
of the husband or wife, if any, is distributed or set out, the residue of the estate shall
be distributed equally to the parent or parents of the intestate, provided no parent
who has abandoned a minor child and continued such abandonment until the time of
death of such child, shall be entitled to share in the estate of such child or be deemed
a parent for the purposes of subdivisions (2) to (4), inclusive, of this subsection.
43. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.10 (Anderson Supp. 1993) reads in pertinent part:
(A). . .(1) "Abandoned" means that a parent of a minor failed without
justifiable cause to communicate with the minor, care for him, and provide for his
maintenance or support as required by law or judicial decree for a period of a least
one year immediately prior to the date of the death of the minor.
(2) "Minor" means a person who is less than eighteen years of age.
(B) Subject to divisions (C), (D), and (E) of this section, a parent who has
abandoned his minor child who subsequently dies intestate as a minor shall not
inherit the real or personal property of the deceased child pursuant to section
2105.06 of the Revised Code. If a parent is prohibited by this division from
inheriting from his deceased child, the real or personal property of the deceased
child shall be distributed, or shall descend and pass ...as if the parent had
predeceased the deceased child.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3(B) (Michie 1991) reads in pertinent part:
If a parent willfully deserts or abandons his or her minor or incapacitated child and
such desertion or abandonment continues until the death of the child, the parent
shall be barred of all interest in the estate of the child by intestate succession unless
the parent resumes the parental relationship and duties and such parental
relationship and duties continue until the death of the child.
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-124(3) (1993) reads in pertinent part: "Inheritance from or
through a child by either natural parent or the parent's kindred is precluded unless that natural
parent has openly treated the child as the parent's and has not refused to support the child."
46. N.D. CENr. CODE § 30.1-04-09 (Supp. 1993) will be amended effective Aug. 1, 1995 as
provided by 1993 N. D. Laws, ch. 334 § 10, to conform to the 1990 revisions of Article 11 of the
Uniform Probate Code, which transformed § 2-109 into § 2-114. Section 2-114(c) extends the
rule to marital as well as nonmarital parents.
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against their chastity. 47
Finally, the Virgin Islands adopted a similar statute based on the
New York Decedent Estate Law.48  Barring unworthy fathers from tak-
ing, however, is still by far the minority rule.
The Uniform Probate Code now also prevents all abandoning or
nonsupporting fathers from taking. Prior to the major revisions to Arti-
cle II, in 1990, the UPC linked support and inheritance only in the case
of nonmarital fathers.49 As previously discussed, this presumably was
due to the focus on proving paternity in cases involving nonmarital chil-
dren and inheritance.
The pertinent intestacy provision of the revised UPC, section 2-
114, no longer distinguishes between marital and nonmarital fathers. It
prohibits both fathers and mothers who do not support their children
from taking from those deceased children, regardless of marital status. 5°
That statute reads in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection . . . (c), for purposes of
intestate succession by, through, or from a person, an individual is the
child of his [or her] natural parents, regardless of their marital status.
The parent and child relationship may be established under [the Uni-
form Parentage Act]....
(c) Inheritance from or through a child by either natural parent
or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless that natural parent has
openly treated the child as his [or hers], and has not refused to sup-
port the child.5
47. P. R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 2261 (1993) incorporated into the intestacy statute by Id.
§ 2593. Note that Louisiana, which also draws its Code from a civil law system, has a tradition of
barring unworthy heirs. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 964 (West 1953); see also supra note 8 with
regard to the civil law tradition and unworthy heirs.
48. V. 1. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 87 (1964) reads in pertinent part:
No distributive share of the estate of the decedent shall be allowed under the
provisions of this chapter...
(5) in the estate of a child to a parent who has neglected or refused to provide
for such child during infancy or who has abandoned such child during infancy
whether or not such child dies during infancy, unless the parental relationship and
duties are subsequently resumed and continue until the death of the child.
If the ... parent is deprived of a distributive share in the estate of a decedent by
the provisions of this section the estate of such decedent shall be distributed ... as
though such ... parent had predeceased the decedent.
49. See Pre-1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-109.
50. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114(c) (1990); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL, FAMILY
PROPERTY LAW 136 n.63 (1991). "The Mississippi statute placed conditions only on a biological
father's right to inherit from a nonmarital child. Pre-1990 § 2-109 had a similar rule. The 1990
UPC [in § 2-114] neither distinguishes between biological mothers and fathers nor between
marital and nonmarital children." Id.
51. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114 (1990).
[Vol. 49:257
DEADBEAT DADS
The major change to the statute in 1990 was aimed at making the
language gender-neutral. The new section 2-114(c) applies to both
mothers and fathers. The pre-1990 section 2-109(c) applied only to
fathers. In addition, the Commissioners have focused on status-neutrali-
zation, i.e., treating inheritance by all children, marital and nonmarital,
as identical once they have established paternity. This is accomplished
in subsection (a) of section 2-114. Subsection (c) deals with the oppo-
site situation-fathers and mothers inheriting from their children. Read
together, subsections (a) and (c) now yield the same results as statutes in
the minority of jurisdictions discussed previously. An unworthy father,
marital or nonmarital, does not take by intestacy from his child. The
drafters of section 2-114 considered this shift important for purposes of
both equal protection and fairness when they decided to extend the rule
to marital as well as nonmarital situations. As a result, the UPC now
adopts the minority rule-requiring acknowledgement and support of all
parents who try to inherit from their children. 2
Section 2-114(c), while it now applies to all fathers, retains the lan-
guage requiring that a natural parent has "openly treated the child as his
[or hers], and has not refused to support the child. ' '53 This language
remains from the prior section 2-109(2)(ii), and several states have
adopted it, or similar language, in statutes dealing with inheritance by
nonmarital fathers.54 This language is not as well suited to marital
fathers. A father of a marital child does not need to openly treat the
child as his own to indicate his paternity since the marriage itself serves
to announce publicly that the child is his. The 1993 revision of the
Comment to section 2-114 adds a clarification: "[t]he phrase 'has not
refused to support the child' refers to the time period during which the
parent has a legal obligation to support the child. ' '55 This concept seems
more applicable to a man not adjudicated as the father until after the
52. Telephone interview with Prof. Lawrence Waggoner, principal draftsman of the 1990
UPC § 2-114, (Aug. 15, 1994). Prof. Waggoner also notes that, given the complexity of the other
major reforms in the revised Article II, the drafters were not able to devote similar attention to
§ 2-114 at that time. The Joint Editorial board is aware of this issue and plans to revisit § 2-114 in
the future.
53. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114 (1990).
54. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(2)(b) (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.045(2)(B) (1985);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2109(2)(b) (1975); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-109(l)(b)(lI) (West
1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508(2)(b) (1979) (All states which use language similar to the
pre-1990 U. P. C. § 2-109 requiring out-of-wedlock person claiming to be father to openly treat
the child as his and not refuse to support the child, in order to inherit from the child.) Note that
Tennessee is unique in adding a section which explicitly requires that any child support arrearges
must be brought up-to-date, with interest, and paid to the other parent or to the child's estate
before a parent is allowed to inherit from a nonmarital child. TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(2)(b)
(1984).
55. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114 cmt. g, 8 U.L.A. 90 (Supp. 1994).
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child's birth, and who thus for some interim period had no legal duty of
support. Marital fathers are legally bound to support their children from
birth.
The jurisdictions that have dealt directly with the issue of both
unworthy marital and nonmarital fathers forfeiting their inheritance have
used the concept of abandonment, in addition to that of failure to support
the child.5 6 Abandonment, as opposed to acknowledgement, is a more
generally applicable concept which focuses on the father's behavior
after paternity has been resolved. Both marital and nonmarital fathers
abandon their children. The concept of abandonment has been applied
to marital fathers in other areas of law, such as neglect and termination
of parental rights.
The drafters of section 2-114(c) of the 1990 UPC did not specifi-
cally consider the consequences of how extending the prior rule in sec-
tion 2-109 to marital fathers would affect the disqualification of kindred
under the new Section 2-114. The 1990 revisions simply continued this
rule. Such a rule seems more appropriate to out-of-wedlock children,
who often do not have much connection to their father's kindred. Even
if a marital father is disqualified from inheriting, it is not as clear that the
statute should also ban his kindred since they are more likely to have
had a relationship with the child than nonmarital kindred. The New
York, Ohio, and Virgin Islands statutes, for example, do not bar kin
from taking, although they do direct where the property goes if the
father forfeits it. As with other probate statutes, the property is distrib-
uted as if the parent had predeceased the child.57
Courts in Montana and North Dakota, those states which have
adopted the 1990 revisions to Article II of the Uniform Probate Code,58
will now have statutory grounds to deny a nonsupporting or abandoning
marital father an intestate share of his minor child's estate. However,
those courts may have to grapple with applying the phrases "openly
56. See, e.g., statutes listed supra note 11.
57. See N. Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4(b) (McKinney 1981); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2105.10(B) (Anderson Supp. 1993); 15 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 87(5) (1964). See Rohan,
supra note 40, at 744. "It should be noted that, although the derelict parent is barred from
inheritance rights in the estate of his child, the statute does not bar the child's paternal or maternal
relatives from inheriting despite the parent's wrongful conduct." Id. at 745 (citing In re Peter's
Estate, 104 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (1951), and quoting In re Haaser's Will, 62 N.Y.S.2d 537, 540
(1946), "[t]here is nothing contained in any provisions... which would disqualify a person as a
distributee because of a relationship to the decedent through the decedent's father.").
58. Fifteen states have enacted the Uniform Probate Code in full with some amendments-
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina and Utah. UNIF. PROB. CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1
(Supp. 1994). Only Montana and North Dakota, however, have adopted the 1990 Revision of
Article II according to the U.L.A. The Montana adoption took effect in 1993 and the North
Dakota revision will take effect Aug. 1, 1995
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treated" and "has not refused to support" in the context of marital
fathers, where they may not neatly fit if such phrases are narrowly inter-
preted. The courts also will be forced to cut off an unworthy father's
relatives from taking if they are otherwise eligible. The language of the
statute mandates this result, even if the relatives have had a close rela-
tionship with the child, which is more likely in a marital situation. Per-
haps the Commissioners in their next revision of section 2-114(c) should
consider adopting language that is more generally applicable to both
marital and nonmarital situations, now that the rule applies to both.
IV. A COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ADOPTING A BEHAVIOR-BASED
MODEL
Adopting a behavior-based model of intestate succession for all
fathers may be appealing because of a desire to punish unworthy fathers
for failing to perform their parental duties. However in considering the
formulation of intestacy/default rules, less is usually better than more. A
clear, simple statute is the best default rule because it results in the most
efficient reallocation of property at death. The following analysis will
consider the costs and benefits of complicating intestacy statutes to
achieve a fair result in cases of unworthy fathers.
The analysis encompasses (1) a review of existing behavior-based
models of intestate succession in American law and whether they are
sufficiently akin to the unworthy father cases to justify adopting a simi-
lar rule; (2) existing theories about how to fashion the best default rule
in a particular area of law; (3) whether adopting a behavior-based model
is consistent with the purposes of the underlying probate process; (4)
whether such a change will alter the behavior of unworthy fathers and
thus lower the overall cost to the legal system; (5) whether a behavior-
based model of intestate succession is consistent with the underlying
philosophical bases of American inheritance law; and (6) whether there
are more effective and less costly alternatives to behavior-based models
of intestate succession that would still yield fair outcomes.
A. Existing Examples of Barring Inheritance by Unworthy Heirs in
American Inheritance Law
The idea that wrongdoing of an heir should affect whether he takes
his share is not common to American inheritance law. The most notable
exception is when an heir kills the decedent, thereby accelerating his
own inheritance. Many states, along with the Uniform Probate Code,
prohibit so-called "slayers" from taking.59
59. E.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803 (1990); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2106(c) (Supp.
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Fewer states bar unworthy spouses and parents from inheriting
under intestacy statutes.60 For example, in North Carolina, a spouse
who "wilfully and without just cause abandons and refuses to live with
the other spouse and is not living with the other spouse at the time of
such spouse's death" loses all rights of intestate succession in the estate
of the other spouse.6'
The North Carolina committee that drafted the statute said it
intended the law to be a "clearly-drawn, comprehensive and up-to-date
Act designed to include practically every instance by which a person
may be prevented from acquiring property rights by his own wrongdo-
ing.''62 The underlying rationale for the North Carolina rule seems to be
concern about preventing unworthy heirs from taking an inheritance.
The drafters intended to bar from taking not only those heirs who mur-
der the decedent, but also bad spouses and parents who fail to live up to
society's ideas of their legal and moral duties. 63 These situations
involve the rare examples in American law of either de jure forced heir-
ship, such as elective shares for spouses, or what this author labels "de
facto forced heirship," i.e., parents inheriting from children who are
legally too young to opt out of the intestacy laws. Forced heirship in
these narrow circumstances justifies an unworthy heir statute. Depriving
an American decedent of the usual ability to cut out someone who has
wronged him militates in favor of a statute which will accomplish that
very act.
When considering actions that warrant forfeiting intestacy rights,
1994) ("Slayer's share. - Any person who participates either as a principal or as an accessory
before the fact in the wilful and unlawful killing of any person shall not in any way acquire
property ot receive any benefits as the result of such killing, but such property or benefits shall be
distributed as provided in Chapter 88 of this code (relating to slayers))."
60. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-I (1984). Subsections (a)(3) and (b)(1) bar all rights of
intestate succession; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW (McKinney 1981) § 5-1.2.; 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2106(a) (Supp. 1994), ("Spouse's share. - A spouse who, for one year or upwards
previous to the death of the other spouse, has willfully neglected or refused to perform the duty to
support the other spouse, or who for one year or upwards has willfully and maliciously deserted
the other spouse, shall have no right or interest under this chapter in the real or personal estate of
the other spouse"); VA. CODE ANN. 64.1-16.3(A) (Michie 1991) ("If a husband or wife willfully
deserts or abandons his or her spouse and such desertion or abandonment continues until the death
of the spouse, the party who deserted the deceased spouse shall be barred of all interest in the
estate of the other by intestate succession, elective share, exempt property, family allowance, and
homestead allowance"); V. I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 87(3), (4) ("No distributive share of the estate
of a decedent shall be allowed under the provisions of this chapter ... (3) to a husband who has
neglected or refused to provide for his wife, or has abandoned her; or (4) to a wife who has
abandoned her husband .. ")
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-l(a)(3) (1984).
62. Special Report, supra note 35, at 3.
63. The Virgina and Pennsylvania statutes have similar structures, grouping unworthy heirs
into one section. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3 (Michie 1991); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2106
(Supp. 1994).
DEADBEAT DADS
murder is distinguishable from behavior such as abandonment or non-
support. With murder, it is the behavior itself which produces the inher-
itance. Someone kills his father and as a result his father's assets flow to
him. Thus, the slayer rule not only punishes, but presumably deters as
well. Society does not want to encourage people to kill to accelerate
their inheritances. Thus, there are at least two justifications for tying
behavior to inheritance in such cases-deterrence and punishment.
However, if someone fails to support his child or spouse, that fail-
ure does'not directly cause the child's or spouse's death and the resulting
wealth transfer. It is not as clear whether forfeiture of inheritance would
deter abandonment or nonsupport. This is discussed in more detail
below. If one concludes that a forfeiture rule will not deter the conduct,
then we must ask whether punishment is a sufficient justification for
such a law. Answering this question involves analyzing the purposes of
the intestacy law. It also requires an evaluation of the costs and benefits
of extending the concept of behavior-based forfeiture to fathers who fail
to support their children.
Choosing criteria to evaluate whether limiting inheritance in this
way is advisable involves analyzing the purposes of intestacy statutes. It
may be that the purposes should change as societal conditions change.
Or it may be that inheritance laws should remain limited in their func-
tion. Some have argued that such goals as equality of opportunity and
even the relatively recent concern for reducing the federal budget deficit
are appropriate reasons for substantially altering our inheritance laws.64
Such arguments are premised on a view of inheritance as a privi-
lege that can be used as a tool to further social goals other than the mere
reallocation of property at death. One might justify extending the
unworthy father rule on a similar basis. Arguably, statutes governing
inheritance should not only provide for the orderly distribution of prop-
erty, but should send messages regarding societal values such as the
obligation of fathers to support their children. As discussed previously,
the effectiveness of such messages is hard to gauge, but the cost of
changing the statute is easier to evaluate.
Intestacy statutes are society's rules for reallocating property on the
decedent's death.65 In establishing such rules, society must choose the
64. Ascher, supra note 1, at 70-73.
65. As one scholar has noted:
Any society that respects property rights during lifetime necessarily reallocates
those rights at an owner's death. In order to avoid the "endless disturbances" to
which Blackstone referred, the rules relating to that reallocation must be simple and
enforceable. Inheritance through the decedent's family or by the decedent's will has
long met that test.
Id. at 78-79.
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most appropriate candidates for receipt of the 'property. Family mem-
bers, especially the spouse and dependent children, are suitable candi-
dates if society is concerned with keeping the decedent's survivors off
the public dole. Society may also want to respect the private property
rights of the decedent. In this case, intestacy statutes should be drafted
to effectuate the decedent's presumed intent as to how his property
should devolve. If society is concerned with other goals, such as equal-
ity of opportunity and redistribution of wealth, some have argued that
the state should receive the property.66
B. Fashioning a Default Rule
In fashioning a default rule in other areas of the law, some com-
mentators advocate the use of efficiency as a goal. 67 For example, in
contract law some suggest that default rules should come as close as
possible to what most people would want. The rationale for using this
"presumed intent" approach to statutory rulemaking is that it is the most
efficient method. In other words, if society can only make one size suit
for everyone, the one that fits the most people should be chosen. In that
way, the amount of costly custom-tailoring required to make the suit fit
can be minimized. Similarly, the closer that legal default rules can be
tailored to what most people want, the lower the costs to the parties
involved, to the legal system, and to society.
Presumed intent is also a long revered precept in inheritance juris-
prudence, based on the tradition of honoring the decedent's rights in his
property even after death. Judges and legislatures alike cite it as the
guiding principle in fashioning intestacy rules and in interpreting wills. 68
Thus, the traditional view that the intestacy/default rules should mirror
the decedent's intent is also consistent with the position that the most
efficient default rule is the one closest to what the parties themselves
would have done.
66. Id. at 88. Ascher argues that the presumption on death should be that all property goes to
the state. "It is hardly open to debate that inherited wealth contradicts equality of opportunity ....
How society reallocates accumulated wealth at death is therefore a critical determinant of the
degree of equality of opportunity succeeding generations will enjoy." Id.
67. See Dobris, supra note 17, at 407. "Many reasons justify good default rules. First, there
are the practical reasons. Professors Ayres and Gertner recently wrote, 'The choice of an
inefficient default rule can generate inefficiencies that, because of strategic bargaining, are much
greater than the cost of contracting around the inefficiency.' " Id. (quoting Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J.
729, 733 (1992)).
68. Despite such declarations, succession law rewards people for not using the default rules.
Transfer tax laws and probate laws that make it more efficient and less costly to have one's
property pass according to the custom-tailored directions of a will or testamentary substitute
encourage people to opt-out of the cumbersome intestacy process.
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Therefore, one might first ask whether a rule barring inheritance by
"unworthy" fathers reflects the wishes of deceased children. If one were
to poll the Colleen Brindamours of the world as to whether they would
want their fathers to share in their estates, one might guess that they
would say no. An abandoning and nonsupporting father would not be a
likely candidate for a child's largesse. If these children knew that their
estates would be enlarged by a wrongful death settlement, and if they
had the opportunity to make a will leaving their property to anyone, they
might well have chosen to cut their father out.
While the supposition that such children would not want their
father to share in their estate may not seem unreasonable to an adult,
literature on child psychology establishes that even children with abu-
sive and neglectful parents desperately want to maintain their relation-
ship with those parents.69 Studies indicate that children continue to love
and bond with parents who have badly abused and/or abandoned them.70
The premise that children like Colleen Brindamour would not want their
fathers to share may be more of an adult perspective on what is fair,
rather than an accurate picture of the actual intent of a child vis-a-vis a
bad parent. It is often difficult to create a rule that accurately reflects
most adult decedents' intent. In these cases, it may be even harder to
gauge the presumed intent of children.7'
69. See, e.g., Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children:
Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in
Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 696-97 (1976). Note
however, that Colleen's father claimed that he tried to contact her and that her mother did not let
him. It is questionable whether the intestacy law can efficiently take into account whether Dad
really loved the child and vice versa.
70. Id. ("There is substantial clinical evidence that some children in foster care retain very
strong ties to their natural parents. In fact, some children continually run away to their own homes
or have to be moved from foster home to foster home because they refuse to accept anyone in
place of their own parents.").
71. A good example of this difficulty is found in the cases striking down, as unconstitutional,
laws barring out-of-wedlock children from taking in intestacy. States tried to justify these laws as
reflecting the desire of most citizens to bar nonmarital children from inheriting from their
biological fathers unless the father acknowledged paternity and/or the parents had later married.
However, the empirical evidence indicated that the statutes did not in fact reflect public attitudes.
These statutes were generally held unconstitutional in a series of cases in the late 1970s and early
1980s as violative of equal protection. For example, in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 765-66
(1977), the United States Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute that limited the right of a
child born out of wedlock to inherit from her natural father to situations where the child's parents
had intermarried and the father had acknowledged the child as his. In commenting on this case,
Fellows, Simon & Rau noted that:
One of the arguments presented to the Supreme Court in support of the statute was
that it mirrors the presumed intentions of the citizens; i.e., unless there was
acknowledgement of the child in addition to marriage to the natural mother, a father
would prefer that his nonmarital child not share in the estate .... In fact, empirical
evidence demonstrates that these statutes do not conform to citizen preferences.
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As society changes over time so, too, does presumed intent. For
example, rules barring nonmarital children from inheriting were, in part,
an expression of society's disapproval of extramarital sex. As society
changed and out of wedlock births became more socially acceptable,
courts adjusted their treatment of these children. 2 The view of fathers
who abandon their children has changed as well. Today, fathers are
viewed as having little if any legal entitlement to a child's earnings, and
the failure to support a child is seen as a heinous dereliction of duty.
Society now punishes abandonment and lack of support more severely
than in the past.73 These social changes may merit a reevaluation of the
types of behavior that warrant forfeiture of inheritance rights, and may
justify a change in the intestacy/default rule.
The presumed intent approach in contract law focuses on repli-
cating what the bargaining parties would have wanted. A default rule
that represents the presumed intent of most bargaining parties is the
most efficient because it results in less costly custom-tailoring and, pre-
sumably, in less litigation. The case of inheritance, however, is not
exactly analogous. Here, "bargaining parties" are replaced by "giving"
and "receiving" parties. Furthermore, the deceased child may not be the
party that should be considered in fashioning the default rule. After all,
The findings in prior studies indicate that the public favors allowing nonmarital
children to inherit once paternity is ascertained.
Fellows, et al, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession
Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 321, 371-72. Courts often acknowledge
that carrying out presumed intent, while a significant goal in the law of succession, may be
subordinate to other more important goals. Laws barring out of wedlock children from inheriting
from their fathers would have given way, even if they did reflect most decedents' wishes, because
the constitutional rights of nonmarital children were of more weight than other factors such as
presumed intent or administrative convenience.
72. The Constitution's equal protection principles have been applicable to the states since the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. It took a long time, however, for courts to view the
treatment of nonmarital children in intestacy statutes as violative of those principles. This may be
due to a combination of jurisprudential expansion of the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the American judiciary's responsiveness to the societal changes going on around
it. Judges do not make law in a vacuum, and the law must continue to be somewhat reflective of
the society's values or it will lose its unique role as the mechanism for social order. It may be,
however, that such official acceptance of nonmarital births has contributed to an increase in such
births. Granted, such statutory changes may be seen as merely responsive to the growth in
nomnarital births, but it may also be that such laws are a catalyst to continued and, perhaps,
accelerated growth of the phenomenon. Laws send messages to citizens beyond their articulated
purpose and thus often have a broader impact on society.
73. Members of the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues have recently developed a bill
that would (1) mandate direct wage withholding of child support obligations by employers when
child support orders are issued or are modified by state courts; (2) require states to withhold
drivers' and occupational licenses from those failing to make child support payments and (3)
require states to make it a crime to willfully fail to pay child support and to provide criminal
penalties for such failure. Rhonda McMillan, Child Support Enforcement Gets Boost, A. B. A. J.,
Sept. 1994, at 87 (describing H.R. 4570).
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the child is dead, and it is the mother-who supported, provided, and
cared for the child-who is the likely party to protest the father's inher-
iting from the child. She, not the deceased child, stands to benefit from
the economic transfer, much like a third-party beneficiary. Perhaps the
default rule should be aimed at minimizing costly legal challenges by
the receiving parties, the heirs, as opposed to focusing on the bargaining
parties, as in contract law. Requiring support and punishing abandon-
ment might arguably reduce probate litigation, because mothers are
more likely to be satisfied that justice has been done if they are econom-
ically benefitted to the exclusion of the father. Rose Brindamour would
not have felt compelled to sue if her husband had not been allowed to
inherit. If there were a statute clearly excluding inheritance by an aban-
doning or nonsupporting father, presumably James Brindamour would
have had no right to claim an intestate share, so Rose Brindamour would
have had no reason to go to court to stop him. Thus, the behavior-based
rule results in increased efficiency. Or does it?
If such a statute had existed in the Brindamour case, a fact finder
would have had to decide whether, how much, and in what form there
had been support, or whether it was a case of abandonment.
Brindamour is a graphic example of the multiple courts that might be
involved in such a case. James Brindamour claimed that he paid his
child support in cash. He lacked records, but he did possess witnesses
(who were not allowed to testify) claiming that his wife collected the
payments at his place of employment every week. The Superior Court
determined what portion of the insurance company settlement went to
the mother for loss of consortium and what portion went to the child's
estate for lost wages and medical expenses. The family court deter-
mined whether and how much support James Brindamour had actually
paid, and ordered him incarcerated pending payment. The appeals court
and the state supreme court heard pleas from both sides for relief. All of
these courts were involved before the Probate Court even began to per-
form its function.
C. The Purposes of the Probate Process
What is the function of the modem Probate Court and how does it
relate to the issue of fathers inheriting from their children? Several pur-
poses underlie the modem probate process. The probate process is
designed to settle the decedent's affairs and to ensure that the decedent's
property reaches the proper recipients.74 To accomplish this, the probate
74. John H. Langbein, The Non-probate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession,
97 HARV. L. REv. 1108, 1117 (1984). "Probate performs three essential functions: (1) making
property owned at death marketable again (title-clearing); (2) paying off the decedent's debts
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court enforces either the custom-tailored product, the decedent's will, or
the default rules, the intestacy statute. The court's job is to effectuate
closure.7
5
Closure is important for a variety of economic and social reasons.
Property must be reallocated on death. Creditors must be paid off.
Heirs or legatees must receive their distributions. Tax authorities must
be given their due. In addition, families may benefit from a formal,
mediated process of settling the decedent's affairs. Emotionally, the
probate process may be akin to the ritual function that a funeral performs
in helping families come to some acceptance of the death. In addition,
families, creditors, and other takers often need a neutral mediator to real-
locate the decedent's assets and settle disputes efficiently.
In effectuating this last goal, intestacy statutes should be as clear as
possible. Adding support as a requirement means that some court, either
family or probate,76 must determine whether a father actually did sup-
port his child. If abandonment triggers a forfeiture, the court must
decide what constitutes abandonment and whether it occurred. Adding
this step to the process appears to make it less efficient, in that the pro-
bate court must engage in fact-finding in addition to simply identifying
heirs under the intestacy statute.
The Brindamour case, however, suggests that even without a sup-
port or abandonment provision in Rhode Island, the probate process was
still inefficient. Mothers, such as Rose Brindamour, who are forced to
split an estate with the father and who may feel justifiably offended by
the lack of "fairness" in having an abandoning and nonsupporting father
inherit, will challenge the father's inheritance on an ad hoc basis. Most
courts will feel bound by a statute that does not contain a bar to "unwor-
thy" fathers. Some courts, however, rule against fathers even in the face
of a clear intestacy statute.77 Such deviations from the statute by courts
reading in a nonexistent exception encourage mothers like Rose
Brindamour to challenge the allocation to the father even though the
statute does not explicitly bar unworthy fathers.
Adopting a behavior-based model may require courts to make
lengthy inquiries into the issue of abandonment or failure to support and
may delay the final distribution of the estate. The lack of a clear statute,
however, may cause similarly lengthy proceedings as a result of chal-
(creditor protection); and (3) implementing the decedent's donative intent respecting the property
that remains once the claims of creditors have been discharged (distribution)." Id..
75. Id.
76. Note that in some states probate and family matters are heard by the same court. In other
states, separate courts hear these matters.
77. Stemler, supra note 28, at 875-76 (citing Keithley v. Keithley, 289 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1980); Guy v. Johnson, 448 N.E.2d 1142 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)).
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lenges by nonabandoning parents. It is not clear that the absence of a
requirement that a father support his child, i.e, adherence to a status-
based model, is more efficient in reducing either the amount of litigation
involved in these cases or the length of the probate process.
D. Will Such a Change Alter Behavior?
Even if a behavior-based model results in slightly more litigation in
individual cases, should the purposes of the intestacy statute be
expanded to include punishing all unworthy fathers anyway?78 Perhaps
we should look at the broader impact of such a rule on the legal system,
i.e., the net efficiency effect. Will such a behavior-based model
encourage fathers to pay more child support? Such improved behavior
may offset the added societal costs of probate delay by reducing the
amount of child support enforcement litigation. 79
An economic analysis of the behavior-based model might apply the
theory that the participants in the legal process, "behave as if they were
rational maximizers.... Like ordinary consumers, they economize by
buying less of a good or commodity when its price rises and more when
it falls."8 Under this analysis, the good in a non-market situation is a
particular kind of behavior, e.g., criminal activity, and the price is a legal
sanction, e.g., a term of imprisonment. In the inheritance context, the
good is the economic benefit derived by a father by failing to pay child
support and the price is the resulting punishment by forfeiture of an
inheritance from his child, discounted by the probability of the child's
dying before the father.
Depending upon the likelihood of inheritance, a father might act
differently if different intestacy rules applied. In the case of wrongful
death, the child has no estate until after death. A father is unlikely to
pay child support or refuse to abandon a child simply because of the
slim chance that his child will be the victim of negligence and the recipi-
ent of a wrongful death award. In other words, a father would discount
the price paid for the nonsupporting or abandoning behavior by the
probability that the child will predecease him and that such death, if it
does occur, will be a result of a tortious act that yields a large settlement
or award.
However, in cases where the child has an estate during life, com-
78. Several states already punish the fathers ofnonmarital children in such fashion. See supra
part III.
79. Or would the deprivation of a traditional right based simply on status contribute to the
message to fathers that they are no longer important, thus adding to the lack of support now
occurring? See Safire, supra note 2.
80. Richard A. Posner, Observation: The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REv. 757,
763 (1975).
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prised of either accumulated earnings or a tort award for a parent's death
or a personal injury to the child, there is a greater likelihood that the
father, as a rational maximizer, will pay child support. Here, the price of
not paying is increased by the possibility of forfeiting a significant
amount of money. The larger the child's estate, the higher the potential
cost of failure to pay child support.
Even if it is not clear that a behavior-based model is the most effi-
cient rule, society may still want to adopt a rule which links bad behav-
ior to forfeiture of inheritance. 8' In some cases, "society is in fact
willing to pay a certain price in reduced efficiency for policies (e.g.,
forbidding racial and religious discrimination) that advance notions of
justice, . . . to preserve intact the social fabric."8" The view of inheri-
tance as a tool for achieving goals other than the simple reallocation of
property on death is implicit in such an approach. Is this approach con-
sistent with the philosophical bases for American inheritance law?
E. The Philosophical Bases of American Inheritance Law
One could solve the problem discussed in this article by simply
abolishing inheritance. In his article entitled Curtailing Inherited
Wealth,8 3 Mark Ascher challenges the well accepted American view that
inheritance is, if not a right, a highly protected statutory entitlement.
Ascher proposes discarding the concept of freedom of testation and in its
place adopting the premise that property rights should end at death. He
contends that inheritance is something our society should tolerate only
when necessary.84
Ascher explores the two competing philosophical theories of inheri-
tance in the American legal system. The first, based on natural law, is
that children are entitled to inherit from their parents because of the right
to be, "nourish'd and maintained by their Parents. ' 85 This view, which
has not been widely adopted by American courts, competes with the
81. As to different definitions of justice and their relationship to economic analysis, see id. at
777-78. Also note the news accounts of Colleen Brindamour's friends picketing and shouting
epithets at her father in front of the Kent County courthouse. See supra notes 12-13. Respect for
the law, which society relies on to maintain order, is undermined if the laws are perceived as
unfair or unjust. Therefore, society has an interest in not only the most efficient rule but in the one
perceived as fairest by the most people.
82. Id. at 778.
83. Ascher, supra note i.
84. Id. at 73. Ascher's proposal allows an unlimited exemption for wealth flowing upstream
to lineal ascendants. This exemption is aimed at encouraging people to support elderly parents
who presumably will therefore not use public resources like Medicaid to fund long-term care. Id.
at 74.




second theory explored by Ascher, which sees inheritance not as a natu-
ral but as a civil right. According to Blackstone, this latter "positivistic"
conception of inheritance was merely a custom eventually transformed
into positive law.
A man's children or nearest relations are usually about him on his
death-bed, and are the earliest witnesses of his decease. They
became, therefore, generally the next immediate occupants, till at
length, in process of time, this frequent usage ripened into general
law.8
6
Society converted this custom into law for purposes of efficiency; it
was the most orderly and least problematic system for reallocating
wealth. Ascher notes that Blackstone's positivistic theory, rather than
Locke's natural rights theory, "has always dominated this country's
thinking on inheritance."87
Under Locke's theory of natural rights, the basis for the child's
right to inherit from the parent was that children were "born weak, and
unable to provide for themselves."88 The underlying premise of the nat-
ural rights theory of inheritance was the duty of parents to support the
children that they brought into the world. The same duties, however,
generally do not flow from minor children to their parents. As a result,
able-bodied parents presumably have no right to call on their children,
especially minors, for support.89 Thus, in considering a father's right to
inherit from a child, the natural rights rationale that the intestate taker is
entitled to support, and thus an inheritance, is inapplicable.
The opposing theory, the positivistic view of inheritance, is perhaps
best summed up in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
dated September 6, 1789:
"[T]hat the earth belongs in usufruct to the living": that the dead have
neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by an indi-
vidual ceases to be his when he himself ceases to be, and reverts to
the society .... If [the society has] formed rules of appropriation,
those rules may give it to the wife and children, or to some one of
them, or to the legatee of the deceased. So they may give it to his
creditor. But the child, the legatee, or creditor takes it, not by any
natural right, but by a law of the society.... Then no man can, by
natural right, oblige the lands he occupied, or the persons who suc-
ceed him in that occupation, to the pa[y]ment of debts contracted by
him. For if he could, he might, during his own life, eat up the usu-
86. Id. (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 10- 11).
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id. at 76 (quoting Locke, supra note 85, § 88, at 207).
89. Although there may be moral and, in some states, legal duties to support elderly,
dependent, and infirm parents.
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fruct of the lands for several generations to come, and then the lands
would belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be the
reverse of our principle. 90
According to Ascher this positivistic theory of inheritance has pre-
vailed over the natural rights theory for a number of reasons:
1) The theory makes intuitive sense. If a society recognizes prop-
erty rights during life, those property interests must of necessity be reor-
dered after death. Simple, clear rules facilitate this process. Family
members are efficient candidates for receipt of the decedent's property
because they are easily identified. However, this choice of family does
not mean that inheritance must be included as a stick in the bundle of
rights which make up the decedent's property.91
2) The natural rights theory is flawed or limited at best. Even if
one agrees that minor children have a right of support from their parents,
it does not necessarily follow that adult children enjoy such a right. In
addition, even minor children's rights need not extend to all of a parent's
estate, regardless of how large it may be.
3) The natural rights theory is inconsistent with the reality of
American succession law. In fact, children in this country do not inherit
all, or for that matter any, of their parents' wealth in many cases.
Ascher characterizes their rights as more contingent than natural. He
uses the Uniform Probate Code's intestacy statute as an example of a
child not inheriting at all if the other parent were married to the decedent
at death.92 The marital deduction allowed under the federal estate and
gift tax system also indicates a preference for spouses over children. 93
Even if one is not married, one may still choose to disinherit one's chil-
dren by will.9 4
4) Finally, the natural rights theory is "relevant but ambiguous." If
one argues that inheritence is a property right protected by the Constitu-
tion, it must be acknowledged that such a theory is inconsistent with the
natural rights world view. The primary focus of natural rights ideology
is people, not property. Inheritance by its very terms, is inconsistent
with egalitarianism and thus clashes with the natural rights ideal of an
egalitarian society. Even prominent proponents of the natural rights
approach, such as Thomas Jefferson, did not embrace its extension to
90. 15 T. JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392-93 (J. Boyd ed. 1958), quoted
in Ascher, supra note 1 at 80-81.
91. Ascher, supra note 1 at 78-79.
92. Id.
93. Id.





Ascher concludes that the natural rights theory and the positivistic
theory of inheritance coexist in the American psyche. Sufficient juris-
prudential basis exists under either theory for limiting an unworthy
father's right to inherit. The natural rights theory supports the right of a
child to inherit because the child has a natural right to support from his
parent. There is no concomitant natural right of a parent to have a child
support him.
The positivistic theory of inheritance views inheritance as a
response to the need to reallocate wealth upon death. Family members
are an efficient choice to receive this wealth, but the positivistic theory
does not hold that they thereby have a right to it. Many societal goals
may be consistent with this theory, and surely society has the power to
control post-death wealth transfers to meet its own needs. For instance,
this positivistive theory is consistent with limiting wealth transfers to
worthy fathers who create productive children/citizens by fulfilling their
duty of support.
A proposal to limit inheritance for abandonment or failure to sup-
port is also consistent with constitutional theories of inheritance. As
pointed out by Ascher, many American courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, have clearly stated that, "[N]othing in the Federal
Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even
abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its
jurisdiction. '96 The broad power of the states to regulate rules gov-
erning succession has been widely upheld.97 As noted above, bars to
inheritance for unworthy heirs already exist in some intestacy statutes. 98
95. Id. (quoting S. Katz, Republicanism & The Law of Inheritance In the American
Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, at 7 (1977)).
96. Id. at 84 (quoting Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942)). Ascher observes
that while states may abolish inheritance, that does not mean that Congress can. He cites to Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987), for the proposition that "complete abolition of both the
descent and devise of a particular class of property may be a taking [under the Fifth
Amendment]". Id. Other commentators have given greater significance to the Court's decision in
Hodel. See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Is the Right to Devise Property Constitutionally Protected?:
The Strange Case ofHodel v. Irving, 24 S.W.U.L. REv. 1195 (1995). "Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice O'Connor declared, without reference to the dominant American political and legal
theory to the contrary, and in direct defiance of Irving Trust Co. v. Day, that the right to pass
property at death . . . is a significant constitutionally protected property right." Id. at 1198
(citations omitted). Chester characterizes Hodel as an "apparent 'sea-change' in the Supreme
Court's view of inheritance" which is arguably a triumph of the natural rights view over the
postivistic view of inheritance. Id. at 1197-99.
97. E.g. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942); Demorest v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 48 (1944).
98. For example, many states have statutes that bar murderers from taking from their victims,
and New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia bar spouses from taking if they
abandon the decedent. "It is significant that although statutes bearing upon one or more branches
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Various theories of private property rights are also consistent with
limitations on inheritance. Locke based private property rights on the
fact that one expended labor to acquire property.99 John Stuart Mill
grounded private property rights on the fact that people produced the
property "by their own exertions."' 00 Ascher thus argues that since adult
children do not participate in the labor producing the parents' property,
they should have no property interest in it.' 0' Similarly, a nonsupporting
father does nothing to produce the estate of the deceased minor child,
unlike the mother who rears, feeds, clothes, and shelters the child.
In John Stuart Mill's view, there may have been a stronger family
claim to inheritance in feudal times. The King granted the property to a
family, and the extended family worked the land and shared in its pro-
duction. The labor of many family members went into the land. There-
fore, the concept of property rights as derived from labor made sense.
However, as Mill stated:
[T]he feudal family... has long perished, and the unit of society is
not now the family or clan.., but the individual; or at most a pair of
individuals, with their unemancipated children. Property is now
inherent in individuals, not in families: the children when grown up
do not follow the occupations or fortunes of the parent: if they par-
ticipate in the parent's pecuniary means it is at his or her pleasure,
and not by a voice in the ownership and government of the
whole .... 102
Mills' description of post-feudal society is even more accurate
today. Under this description, there is arguably still justification for par-
ents to inherit from their children since they invest time, energy and
money in raising those children and thus have a hand in the accumula-
tion of their estates. While most parents may have such a basis for
inheriting from minor children, a nonsupporting or abandoning father
has no such basis for inheriting his deceased child's intestate estate.1
0 3
of the general problem have been enacted in almost half of the states, no one of them has ever
been held unconstitutional. The constitutionality of a statute has been directly attacked in only
one case, in which it was easily upheld; but there are numerous cases in which its constitutionality
was tacitly assumed." John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another - A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARv. L. REv. 715, 720-21, (citing Hamblin v. Marchant, 175 Pac. 678,
aff'd on rehearing, 180 Pac. 811 (Kan. 1919) (upholding the constitutionality of a "slayer"
statute)).
99. Ascher, supra note 1, at 81.
100. Mill, supra note 1, § 1, at 218, quoted in Ascher, supra note 1, at 81.
101. Ascher, supra note I, at 81.
102. Mill, supra note 1, § 3 at 222, quoted in Ascher, supra note 1, at 81.
103. However, a father who has not abandoned a child, but is merely slightly behind in child
support might have some claim. If he has been available to the child and has an established
relationship with her, and the support is not significantly in arrears, perhaps he should have some
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F. Are There Effective and Less Costly Alternatives?
Whether a particular change in the intestacy statute is advisable
depends upon the alternatives to such a change. Can the same result be
achieved at less cost by amending a different statute or using another
legal remedy? Are there other ways that the law can prevent aban-
doning or nonsupporting fathers from inheriting from their minor chil-
dren, and are the alternatives as effective or less costly than altering the
intestacy/default rules?
(a) Judges can impose a constructive trust on a father's intestate
share to avoid unjust enrichment. A constructive trust is an equitable
remedy that judges may use to undo what they see as an unjust or inap-
propriate result arising from the strict application of a statute or case
law. As Dukeminier and Johanson describe it:
When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the benefi-
cial interest, equity converts him into a trustee. A constructive
trustee is under a duty to convey the property to another on the
ground that retention of the property would be wrongful."°4
Courts who have imposed constructive trusts have cited the follow-
ing prerequisites: "(1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a
promise, express or implied, (3) a transfer of property in reliance on the
promise, and (4) unjust enrichment of the transferee."10 Constructive
trusts are most commonly used when someone procures an inheritance
by fraud. However, they have also been used when a confidential rela-
tionship or a promise is lacking but the court wants to prevent unjust
enrichment by the recipient. The classic example is the recipient who
stands to inherit from someone he murdered:' 06
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the argument that a
murderer should not be allowed to inherit began to be made with
some frequency. At first, a majority of courts in this country rejected
it. Typically, the court professed unhappiness at letting the murderer
inherit, but said that any change in the law must come from
legislation....
... Dean Ames in a leading article first published in 1897 ...
suggested, however, that in order to prevent "the flagrant injustice of
an atrocious criminal enriching himself by his crime," courts of
share of the child's estate based on his investment in that child. Fairness would seem to dictate
that such share be offset by his delinquent child support.
104. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 460 (4th ed.
1990).
105. Id. at 460-61.
106. Id. at 461.
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equity should impose a constructive trust on the murderer.. . .The
use of the constructive trust in this situation has been favored by
other writers including the authors of the Restatement of Restitution
and has been followed by many courts.' 0 7
The use of constructive trusts in this context arguably allows the
courts to do justice without being forced to read implied exceptions into
the intestacy statutes. The constructive trust device simply "compel[s]
the murderer to surrender the profits of his crime."' 0 8 William McGov-
em disagrees with this rationale, calling it "somewhat disingenuous" and
notes the cumbersome nature of the remedy due to the split between
courts of law and courts of equity.'0 9 He advocates the statutory solu-
tion that the Uniform Probate Code and some states have adopted." 0
The slayer statutes are similar in theory to the situation discussed
herein. Both involve unworthy heirs and the use of constructive trusts as
a remedy to achieve justice. As McGovern notes, however, making for-
feiture of inheritance in the slayer situation a statutory exception to the
intestacy rule has the advantage of both clarity and evenness of applica-
tion. Similarly, making forfeiture of an unworthy father's inheritance
from his child a statutory exception appears to be the clearest and easiest
rule to apply.
(b) Minor children, due to their lack of legal capacity, are generally
not allowed to opt out of the intestacy default rules. The idea that a
testator must have sufficient capacity to form the requisite intent to
make a testamentary gift is fundamental to the law of wills. Capacity in
this context means that one understands the nature of one's property, the
natural objects of one's bounty, and the nature of the testamentary act of
giving.
Our society's understanding of a child's more limited psychological
comprehension of the world in contrast to that of an adult, is reflected in
many areas of the law. The law limits a child's right to contract, to
make medical decisions, to be a witness in a court proceeding, to vote, to
make inter vivos gifts, and to execute wills and trusts. These limitations
mirror our belief that a particular level of understanding and comprehen-
sion, i.e., capacity, is required to perform these acts and be bound by
them.
In the United States, the age of majority has been lowered from the
age of twenty-one to eighteen. The right to testify in court has been
107. William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MicH. L. REv. 65,
67-68 (1969) (quoting J. Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It? 36 AM.
LAw REG. 225 (1897)) (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 68.
109. Id. at 68-71.
110. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803 (1990); CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 1990).
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extended to increasingly younger children. Moreover, there is a move-
ment in the criminal law to make younger children accountable as adults
for crimes they commit. If a child with an abandoning or nonsupporting
father were granted the privilege of making a will, she could, by testa-
mentary act, opt out of the intestacy scheme and prevent him from tak-
ing a share of her estate.
Children who own substantial assets during life must have a guard-
ian appointed to manage those assets."' Guardians can establish inter
vivos trusts to manage the minor's property, but they cannot make wills
because the law views that as an intimately personal right. Thus, such
property is left to pass pursuant to the intestacy laws if the minor dies
prior to reaching the age required to make a will.12
The age required to make a will in most states is eighteen, the age
of majority. Some children under the age of eighteen, however, may
make wills as emancipated minors. Presumably, these children have
demonstrated financial and emotional independence sufficient to warrant
the extension to them of various adult rights. However, even if the right
to make a will were extended to unemancipated minors as well, it is not
clear that such a change would solve the Brindamour problem. In cases
of wrongful death, a minor child does not know she will be the victim of
negligence. She will usually have no appreciable estate during life and
will therefore be unlikely to make a will disinheriting her unworthy
father.
111. This is a well-established rule.
In most jurisdictions, there is no impediment to ownership of property by a
minor.... The problems ... arise when it is necessary or desirable to deal with
property owned by a minor. The minor's incompetency will bar any action with
respect to the property. The property cannot be sold, exchanged, or disposed of in
any manner by the minor because minors generally can disaffirm contracts which
they enter into during minority ....
Due to the inability of a minor to deal with his or her property, legal
guardianships have been used.
Gifts to Minors, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 403-3rd § E, at A-15 (1988).
112. That age has changed throughout history and has varied among societies. As Atkinson
notes in his treatise on wills:
The civil law rule was that males of fourteen and females of twelve had the age
capacity to make a will. Above these years persons had testamentary powers
provided they had sufficient mental capacity. Below these ages no degree of mental
maturity and soundness would suffice ....
The original Statute of Wills, 1540, literally permitted a devise of land by
minors, but within three years an amendment declared that the devises should not be
good unless the testator was twenty-one years of age. This has been the English rule
ever since as to wills of realty, and after the Wills Act, 1837, as to the testaments of
personalty as well.
THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 50, at 229-30 (2d ed. 1953) (citations
omitted).
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Even if a child does have a substantial estate, extending the right to
make a will to unemancipated minors raises problems of undue influ-
ence by the mother, the natural default taker if the father is disinherited.
An unemancipated minor living with his mother is very likely to suc-
cumb to his mother's natural animosity toward an abandoning or non-
supporting father. A testator under undue influence has been defined as
one who, "if he could speak his wishes to the last ... would say, 'this is
not my wish, but I must do it'."113 This definition of undue influence
immediately brings to mind the parent-child relationship and the abso-
lute financial, emotional and legal domination by a parent over a minor
child.
Presumably, society's consensus as to the capacity necessary to dis-
pose of property would not extend to children younger than about twelve
years of age. Most people would agree that a child of four or five should
not be allowed to make a will. Thus, the power to make a will cannot
solve the problem of an unworthy father inheriting from those children
still too young to make a will. The only solution that prevents the
fathers of children of any and all ages from taking is to alter the default
rules and amend the intestacy statutes.
Extending the power to make a will to children will also result in
some abandoning fathers actually being explicitly included in their chil-
dren's wills. As noted before, children whose parents abandon or abuse
them often retain strong psychological bonds with such parents. 114 Soci-
ety has a strong interest in preventing the inclusion of abandoning or
abusive parents in the wills of their children despite the child's wishes.
It also has a stronger interest in decisionmaking for minors than for
adults, given a minor's lack of judgement and the need to protect the
minor from himself. If one were to apply a balancing test, the societal
interest in encouraging fathers to perform their duties militates for
allowing the state to decide how the child's estate should be distributed,
even in the face of contrary desires by the child.
Another problem with extending the privilege to make a will to
children involves the range of candidates for receipt of their estate. The
supporting parent, often the mother, is the candidate that most people
would feel is worthy to take the deceased child's estate. If a child is
granted complete power of disposition over her property however she
might not choose her mother but rather a best friend. This problem
might be solved by use of a negative declaration, as opposed to giving
113. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 104, at 144 (quoting Sir James Hannen, in
Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 Prob. Div. 81 (1885)).




the minor child absolute freedom of testation. However, negative wills
have long been disfavored under American law. 1 5 As some scholars
have noted, this position has recently come under fire as doing damage
to the principle of testamentary intent. Nonetheless, it still appears to be
the general rule." 6
(c) As discussed above, guardians may be appointed to manage the
estates of children with substantial estates. These guardians can estab-
lish express trusts to manage the property for the child's benefit during
life but cannot make a will to dispose of the child's property after death.
Presumably, the express trust suffers the same problems outlined above
regarding wills. The child without assets will not see a need to set up a
trust, and the minor child with assets lacks the appropriate testamentary
capacity to direct the disposition of his assets on death.
Imposing a constructive trust on an unworthy father's intestate
share would solve the problem but is cumbersome and costly. A will or
an express trust containing dispositive choices would not always provide
a solution in the context of a wrongful death. Extending the privilege to
make a will to unemancipated minors raises problems of capacity and
undue influence. Thus, the alternatives to amending the intestacy stat-
utes are in fact more costly and/or not effective.
V. ADOPTING AN EFFICIENT BEHAVIOR-BASED MODEL OF
INHERITANCE FOR UNWORTHY FATHERS
What type of statute barring abandoning or nonsupporting fathers
from taking in intestacy is the least costly while still producing a fair
result? Several costs are inherent in moving from a purely status-based
system of inheritance to a behavior-based model. In a status-based
scheme, the court need only decide who is a relative based on accepted
principles of consanguinity. Once that determination is made, the prop-
erty simply flows according to the particular state's intestacy statute.
In a behavior-based model, however, the court must make a thresh-
old decision as to whether a father has abandoned or failed to support
115. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 104, at 433.
An old rule of American wills law says that disinheritance is not possible by simple
declaration that 'my son John shall receive none of my property.' To disinherit, it is
necessary that the entire estate be devised to other persons. .... A testator cannot
alter the intestate distribution scheme without giving the property to others.
Id.
116. Id. (citing J. Andrew Heaton, Comment, The Intestate Claims of Heirs Excluded by Will.
Should "Negative Wills'" Be Enforced?, 52 U. Cnl. L. Rav. 177 (1985)). But see UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-101(b) cmt. (1990) ("By specifically authorizing so-called negative wills, subsection (b)
reverses the usually accepted common-law rule, which defeats a testator's intent for no sufficient
reason.").
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the deceased child. If he has, then he is eliminated from the chain of
inheritance. Thus, the initial decision as to who is eligible to take in
intestacy is more difficult and potentially more time-consuming in a
behavior-based model. One of the first goals, therefore, in developing a
behavior-based model is to identify the most efficient decisionmaker to
make the threshold finding of abandonment or lack of support.
A primary factor involved in the cost of moving from a status-
based to a behavior-based model is the increased opportunity for judicial
discretion. Deviating from a purely status-based model raises questions
regarding the amount of contact with the child that is adequate to pre-
vent forfeiture by the father. Does being around for two years of the
child's life, three visits a year, or a birthday and a Christmas card suf-
fice? Giving such discretion to probate judges in those states where the
probate court lacks jurisdiction over domestic relations matters may be
the most inefficient approach to a behavior-based model." 7
One way to minimize the cost of such a model is to develop a
statute that ties a finding of abandonment or lack of support to a prior
adjudication by a different court, presumably a family court. This has
not generally been the approach in the few states that have adopted this
model. These statutes contemplate a de novo inquiry by the probate
court into the father's behavior, thereby requiring the application of elu-
sive concepts like abandonment or nonsupport.
States have developed various methods of defining these concepts.
For example, in Estate of Devin W. Etheridge,' 18 the New York Surro-
gate's Court imported the definition of nonsupport from the statute pro-
viding for spousal forfeiture of an intestate share for nonsupport. The
New York statute at issue in Etheridge required that the court find: (1)
there was a failure to support; (2) the disqualified spouse had the means
to provide support; (3) no grounds exist to exonerate the spouse from
this obligation; and (4) the support was requested. The court differenti-
117. Whether giving more discretion to probate courts will yield fair and consistent results is
also a function of the quality of the American probate bench.
There have long been difficulties in staffing the American probate bench, and
some of the people who serve there . . . are menacing
•.. [T]he integrity and ability of the American probate bench has [sic] so often
been found wanting that confidence in the predictability and correctness of
adjudication in these courts has been impaired. Americans can only look with envy
to the esteemed and meritocratic chancery bench that conducts probate adjudication
in English and Commonwealth jurisdictions.
John H. Langbein, Will Contest, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2044 (1994) (reviewing DAVID MARGOLICK,
UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON AND JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993)).
118. Sur. Ct., 202 N.Y.L.J. 109 (1989).
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ated between spouses and children by noting that if (3) or (4) are
applied:
[A] parent would only be "exonerated" for non-support, notwith-
standing the ability to support, if it could be established that support
was tendered and rejected or, at the very least, the failure to support
was based upon a reasonable belief that another person was providing
the support and any offer of support would be futile because it would
be rejected. 1 9
The New York statute is couched in the alternative: Either (1)
parental failure or refusal to provide for the child or (2) parental aban-
donment, is sufficient to deprive the parent of the right to inherit from
the child. 120  Abandonment "has been defined as 'a voluntary breach or
neglect of duty to care for and train a child and the duty to supervise and
guide his growth and development.' ",121 The burden is on the parties
asserting abandonment to prove such behavior on the part of the
father. 122
The Ohio statute defines "abandoned" in the statute itself:
'Abandoned' means that a parent of a minor failed without justifiable
cause to communicate with the minor, care for him, and provide for
his maintenance or support as required by law or judicial decree for a
period of a least one year immediately prior to the date of the death of
the minor.123
These models, whether they import a definition from another area
of the law or explicitly define abandonment in the statute itself, have a
common flaw. Models that contemplate a postmortem de novo inquiry
119. Id. The Surrogate's Court in Etheridge faced a proof issue similar to that which the
Brindamour case raised. The father in each case alleged that support had been paid in cash. The
court gave this claim no credence because there was a lack of receipts and witnesses.
120. N.Y. EsT. PoweRs & TRUSTS LAw § 4-1.4 (McKinney 1981); Rohan, Practice
Commentary, supra note 40, at 744.
121. Id. (citing In re Musczak's Estate, 92 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (1949), and noting that "[t]he fact
that a separation or divorce decree has been procured against the derelict parent... with or without
visitation rights in the derelict parent, may substantially dilute the duty of such parent to supervise
the growth and development of the child, but it does not entirely absolve the parent from
performance of such duty," citing In re Daniel's Estate, 90 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1949)).
122. Matter of Estate of Clark, 501 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1986).
In Matter of Estate of Clark ... the Appellate Division, Third Department, re-
affirmed the principle that abandonment by a father is not to be presumed, and the
burden of proof rests upon the party asserting such abandonment. Moreover, a
prima facie case of abandonment is not made out by a mere showing that the father
left the family domicile during the decedent's minority.
Rohan, supra note 40, at 130.
123. OHio Rv. CODE ANN. § 2105.10(A)(1)(Anderson Supp. 1993). The Ohio statute places
the burden of proving abandonment, by a preponderance of the evidence, on the administrator in a
separate probate court proceeding. The statute is detailed in its outline of this proceeding. See id.
§ 2105.10(D).
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by the probate court into the unworthy father's behavior during the
child's life are least likely to minimize the cost of amending intestacy
statutes to achieve a fair result. A statute that requires the probate court
to give deference to a family court's ruling during the child's life as to
abandonment or failure to support reduces the court's discretion, and
thus the time and costs of implementing a behavior-based model.1 24 A
family court presumably hears nonsupport cases on a regular basis and
has the expertise to efficiently dispose of such matters. Unlike the pro-
visions in the Ohio statute, 125 under such a model the probate court
124. In many states the probate court is distinct from the family court. In some states, such as
Massachusetts, however, the probate court hears both probate and domestic relations cases. In
such a state, the probate court is sufficiently expert to efficiently dispose of the issue of
abandonment and support itself.
125. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.10(D)-(E) (Anderson Supp. 1993):
(D)(I) The prohibition against inheritance set forth in division (B) of this
section shall be enforceable only in accordance with a probate court adjudication
rendered pursuant to this division.
(2) If the administrator of the estate of an intestate minor has actual
knowledge, or reasonable cause to believe, that the minor was abandoned by a
parent, the administrator shall file a petition pursuant to section 2123.02 of the
Revised Code to obtain an adjudication that the parent abandoned the child and that,
because of the prohibition against inheritance set forth in division (B) of this
section, the parent shall not be considered to be an heir at law of, and shall not be
entitled to inherit the real and personal property of, the deceased child pursuant to
section 2105.06 of the Revised Code. That parent shall be named as a defendant in
the petition and, whether or not that parent is a resident of this state, shall be served
with a summons and a copy of the petition in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure. In the heirship determination proceeding, the administrator has the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parent abandoned
the child. If, after the hearing, the probate court finds that the administrator has
sustained that burden of proof, the probate court shall include in its adjudication
described in section 2123.05 of the Revised Code its findings that the parent
abandoned the child and, because of the prohibition against inheritance set forth in
division (B) of this section, the parent shall not be considered to be an heir at law of,
and shall not be entitled to inherit the real and personal property of, the deceased
child pursuant to section 2105.06 of the Revised Code. If the probate court so finds,
then, upon the entry of its adjudication on its journal, the administrator may make a
final distribution of the estate of the deceased child in accordance with division (B)
of this section.
(3) An heirship determination proceeding resulting from the filing of a petition
pursuant to this division shall be conducted in accordance with Chapter 2123. of the
Revised Code, except to the extent that a provision of this section conflicts with a
provision of that chapter, in which case the provision of this section shall control.
(E) If the administrator of the estate of an intestate minor has not commenced
an heirship determination proceeding as described in division (D) of this section
within four months from the date that he receives his letters of administration, then
such a proceeding may not be commenced subsequently, no parent of the deceased
child shall be prohibited from inheriting the real or personal property of the
deceased child pursuant to division (B) of this section, and the probate of the estate
of the deceased child in accordance with section 2105.06 and other relevant sections
of the Revised Code shall be forever binding.
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would not undertake an independent inquiry into nonsupport or aban-
donment, and would simply honor a family court finding.
States considering a behavior-based model might consider adopting
a statute that uses rebuttable presumptions to cut down on litigation as to
the issue of unworthy behavior. For example, if a family court entered
an order of child support during the child's life and issued a judgement
against the father for noncompliance with the support order, there would
be a rebuttable presumption that the father is an "unworthy father" for
purposes of inheriting from the deceased child. If the father had com-
pelling reasons for failing to support or for abandoning the child, such as
severe physical or mental disability, he could move for a hearing on the
matter in family court. If the family court exonerated him, he could
bring that finding back to the probate court which would be bound to
honor it for purposes of intestate succession. This procedure (1) puts the
task of deciding the elusive question of whether there has been abandon-
ment or nonsupport where it belongs, in a court that has experience in
these matters; and (2) cuts down on frivolous litigation by deterring
abandoning and nonsupporting fathers from bringing an action without a
compelling excuse, or without substantial evidence with which to rebut
the presumption.
Similarly, a rebuttable presumption could be employed to indicate
that a father is a "worthy" father and should take in intestacy if no order
had been entered against him during the child's life. Such a presump-
tion puts the burden on the supporting parent, typically the mother, to go
to court during the child's life to seek child support. The mother is
generally the primary economic beneficiary if the father is barred.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to place some burden on her to demon-
strate, during the child's life, that she and the child were actually harmed
by the father's abandonment or failure to support. The mother could
also rebut the presumption in favor of the father in family court if she
had a compelling reason for not seeking support during the child's
life.126 Again, the probate court would either be required to find the
father worthy and distribute a share of the child's estate to him in the
absence of a nonsupport order during life, or, if the mother successfully
rebutted the presumption in a family court hearing, declare the father
unworthy and forfeit his share.
Such a model would also allow for an efficient resolution of two
subsidiary problems that arise in these cases. The first is the issue of
126. Even if a father leaves the state, there are now interstate mechanisms allowing a mother to
go to court in her own state and enforce a judgement against the father in whatever state he may
be. For a comprehensive discussion of these mechanisms, see generally 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR.,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (West 2d Ed. 1987).
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whether abandonment or failure to support was willful. As noted above,
a father who is permanently disabled and incapable of working may
legitimately be unable to support the child and still have a nonsupport
judgement entered against him. The second is the redemption of unwor-
thy fathers. Fathers who abandoned or failed to support in the past may
begin to reestablish a relationship with the child and provide some sup-
port in the period prior to the child's death. The North Carolina and
New York statutes allow for such a redemption of unworthy fathers.
Both contain a reference to the resumption of the parental relationship,
as do the Virginia and Virgin Islands statutes. 2 7 Under the New York
statute, a bad father forfeits his inheritance, "unless the parental relation-
ship and duties are subsequently resumed and continue until the death of
the child."' 28 The North Carolina statute is more specific. The father
may again inherit, "[w]here the abandoning parent resumed its care and
maintenance at least one year prior to the death of the child and contin-
ued the same until its death," or where the parent, if deprived of custody,
"has substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contri-
bution to the support of the child."' 29 A behavior-based model that uses
the family court as a forum to decide the issues of abandonment or non-
support, also provides an automatic forum for a father to prove a legiti-
mate reason for his behavior or to establish his redeeming behavior prior
to the child's death.
This system of rebuttable presumptions balances the need for an
efficient probate process and the desire for a fair allocation of the
deceased child's estate. While it still lengthens the probate process if a
parent moves for a hearing by the family court, this model does not
place the difficult inquiry into abandonment or nonsupport with the pro-
bate court, the court least able to reach an efficient disposition of these
issues.
Finally, an efficient behavior-based model must also provide a sim-
ple mechanism to pass property if a father is eliminated from the intes-
tacy scheme based on his behavior. If a father is barred, New York,
Ohio, and the Virgin Islands pass the property as if the father prede-
ceased the child, and unlike the UPC, do not bar the father's relatives
from taking. 30 This mechanism is most likely to produce an efficient
127. The Virginia statute states that "the parent shall be barred ... unless the parent resumes
the parental relationship and duties and such parental relationship and duties continue until the
death of the child." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3(B) (Michie 1994 Supp.); V. I. CODE ANN. tit. 15,
§ 87(5)(1964).
128. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 4-1.4(a) (McKinney 1995).
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-A-2(1)-(2) (1984).
130. N.Y. EST POWERS & TRUST LAW § 4-1.4(b) (McKinney 1995); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2105.10(B) (Anderson Supp. 1993); V. I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 87 (1964) (based on the New
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disposition of the child's estate, and to minimize litigation by the
father's unhappy relatives who may have had a close and supportive
relationship with the child. These relatives would not generally share
the estate with the mother because, under most intestacy statutes, the
mother takes the entire estate if the father predeceases the mother. An
unworthy father's kindred would typically only take if the mother were
deceased (or were found to be unworthy herself).
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has addressed the costs and benefits of adopting a
behavior-based model of inheritance by fathers from their deceased chil-
dren. In considering intestacy/default rules, less is usually better than
more. A simple, clear statute is the preferred default rule because it
results in the most efficient reallocation of property at death. American
inheritance law has been relatively less concerned with "fair" realloca-
tion of property at death because of its embrace of extensive freedom of
testation and minimal forced heirship. In the case of children who die as
minors and leave property, however, de facto forced heirship is the rule.
Minor children cannot opt out of the default system of intestacy by exe-
cuting a will. They are therefore forced to leave property to their par-
ents, even if their parents are unworthy.
While it is generally the better rule to leave the default statutes
simple and to avoid addressing every exceptional situation, there is a
much stronger argument for deviating from a status-based model and
introducing a behavior-based test for parents inheriting from children.
Usually, the fact that the situation at issue occurs infrequently militates
in favor of not complicating the default statute. In this case, however,
the decedent is a child and is therefore not allowed to opt out of the
default system. This, together with the uncommon nature of the cases,
weighs in favor of addressing the situation in the intestacy statute. Such
cases will not occur often and should not hinder the efficient operation
of the intestacy statutes.
Finally, adopting a behavior-based model of inheritance in these
cases has the added social benefit of limiting the temptation for judges to
engage in the "new model of bold, assertive judging.""'3 A clear statute
will eliminate the need for judges to read nonexistent exceptions into the
York statute, it states, "If the . . . parent is deprived of a distributive share in the estate of a
decedent . . .the estate of such decedent shall be distributed . . . as though such . . . parent had
predeceased the decedent.").
131. Mary Ann Glendon, Partial Justice, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1994, at 22-26. Glendon
identifies the dangers of "adventurous judging" and criticizes the notion that, "there are wrongs to
be righted and that it is the responsibility" ofjudges to do it. She argues that decisions based on a
judge's personal sense of fairness and perception of "what outcome is just, who needs protection,
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intestacy statutes in order to remedy a perceived injustice. Clear legisla-
tive action is preferable to having judges legislate from the bench.
A carefully crafted rule that bars marital and nonmarital parents
who abandon or fail to support their children from taking in intestacy
should be adopted by more states. If state legislatures do not address
this issue, courts will continue to do so on an ad hoc basis, like Judge
Darigan in the Brindamour case. They will do so with few, if any, care-
fully considered guidelines. Such case by case adjudication results in
inconsistent application of the law, outrage on the part of the public
against such unfair allocations of property on a child's death, and a con-
comitant lack of respect for the law. Adopting a behavior-based model
of inheritance in these cases can produce both a fair and efficient result,
and an outcome that benefits both the parties involved and the legal
system as a whole.
and who deserves compassion" will wreak havoc with the principle of coherent, predictable
results on which our system is based. Id.
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